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Abstract
BACKGROUND
The long-term decline in cohort fertility in highly developed countries has been widely
documented. However, no systematic analysis has investigated which parity contributed
most to the fertility decline to low and very low levels.
OBJECTIVE
We examine how the contribution of changing parity progression ratios varied across
cohorts, countries, and broader regions in Europe, North America, Australia, and East
Asia. We pay special attention to countries that reached very low completed cohort
fertility, below 1.75 children per woman.
METHODS
Using population censuses and large-scale surveys for 32 low fertility countries, we
decompose the change in completed cohort fertility among women born between 1940
and 1970. The decomposition method takes into account the sequential nature of
childbearing as a chain of transitions from lower to higher parities.
RESULTS
Among women born between 1940 and 1955, the fertility decline was mostly driven by
reductions in the progression ratios to third and higher-order births. By contrast, among
women born between 1955 and 1970, changes in fertility showed distinct regional
patterns: in Central and Eastern Europe they were fuelled by falling second-birth rates,
whereas in the German-speaking countries, Southern Europe, and East Asia decreases
in first-birth rates played the major role.
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of Demography/Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria. E-Mail: krystof.zeman@oeaw.ac.at.
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CONCLUSIONS
Pathways to low and very low fertility show distinct geographical patterns, which
reflect the diversity of the cultural, socioeconomic, and institutional settings of low
fertility countries.
CONTRIBUTION
Our study highlights the importance of analysing parity-specific components of fertility
in order to understand fertility change and variation. We demonstrate that similar low
levels of completed cohort fertility can result from different combinations of parity-
specific fertility rates.
1. Introduction
The long-term decline in cohort fertility rates across developed countries has been
widely documented (Frejka and Calot 2001; Frejka 2008; Myrskylä, Goldstein, and
Cheng 2013). Among women born around 1940, who were in prime reproductive years
towards the end of the post-war baby boom, the completed cohort fertility rate was
between 1.9 and 2.5 children per woman in most European countries and in Japan,
between  2.5  and  2.7  children  per  woman  in  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  United
States, and even higher in South Korea and Singapore. By contrast, women born three
decades later, around 1970, had on average fewer than two children in all the highly
developed countries except Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway, the United States,
and a few smaller European countries (Council of Europe 2005; Frejka, Jones, and
Sardon 2010; Sobotka et al. 2015; Van Bavel et al. 2015; Human Fertility Database
2016).  This  fall  in  fertility  was  accompanied  by  a  continuous  decline  in  the  share  of
large families (with three and more children), and, especially among women born in the
1960s, by increasing proportions of women without children or with one child (e.g.,
Schoen 2006; Frejka and Sardon 2007; Frejka 2008; Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010;
Sobotka 2017; Beaujouan, Brzozowska, and Zeman 2016; Human Fertility Database
2016; Van Bavel et al. 2015).
So far, no systematic analysis has been conducted of how the changes in parity-
specific components of fertility contributed to the decline in completed cohort fertility
rates (CFR) in low fertility countries. Previous research has indicated that studying
parity-specific changes in fertility is crucial for understanding fertility declines (Ní
Bhrolcháin 1987; Barkalov 1999), especially in post-transitional fertility regimes
(Wilson 2013). While the shift from relatively high to around-replacement fertility was
certainly dominated by the fall in third and higher-order birth rates, fertility decreases to
lower levels may have been driven by declining first and second-birth rates. This
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expectation is in line with Frejka’s (2008) analysis, which finds that decreasing
progressions to first and second births played a key role in fertility declines among
European women born after 1955. Billari and Kohler (2004: 171) suggest that a pattern
of ‘lowest-low’ fertility in Europe is characterised by “a low probability of progression
after the first child (but not particularly low levels of first-birth childbearing)”.
However, many factors, including family policies, economic uncertainty, family size
norms and preferences, and population heterogeneity, may have affected the importance
of specific parities in the cohort fertility decline to low levels. As a result, low fertility
countries vary considerably in their parity composition (Frejka and Sardon 2007).
In this study we analyse the role of changing first,4 second, and third and higher-
order birth rates in cohort fertility decline in 32 low fertility countries in Europe, North
America, Australia, and East Asia including Singapore.5 Specifically, for each country
we decompose the change in completed cohort fertility among women born between
1940 and 19706 using parity progression ratios (PPR). The data is derived mostly from
censuses, registers, and large-scale surveys containing a question on the number of
children  ever  born.  We  focus  on  women  aged  43  or  older  at  the  time  the  data  was
collected, who had by then (almost) completed their childbearing. By adopting a cohort
perspective we analyse the achieved level (quantum) of fertility and do not have to
address timing distortions that have strongly affected period fertility indicators in the
highly developed countries in the last four decades (Billari and Kohler 2004; Bongaarts
and Sobotka 2012).
We also analyse how the contribution of the changing parity progression ratios to
completed cohort fertility varied across cohorts and countries, and whether it was
different in countries with very low completed cohort fertility below 1.75 children per
woman.
Our study is structured as follows. First, we review the existing evidence on cohort
fertility trends in the highly developed countries (Section 2). This part also outlines our
main expectations about the geographical variation of parity-specific drivers of cohort
fertility decline. In Section 3 we outline the data and methods used. Section 4 examines
4 Parity progression ratio to first birth and childlessness are complementary, therefore we use the terms
‘declining parity progression ratio to first birth’ and ‘increasing childlessness’ interchangeably. Next to
‘parity progression ratios’ we also use the term ‘parity-specific transition rates’.
5 Unlike the other Asian countries and territories with a longer history of low fertility (Japan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Taiwan), which are in East Asia, Singapore belongs to South-East Asia. For simplicity, we label
this culturally similar set of rich countries ‘East Asia’, following the example of Frejka, Jones, and Sardon
(2010).
6 The latest cohort covered in this study differs by country, depending on data availability. It ranges from the
1965 cohort (data for Switzerland) up until the 1971 cohort (data for England and Wales and Finland). Most
countries (19 out of 32) are covered up to the 1967 or 1968 cohorts. For simplicity, we label the latest cohort
covered across all the analysed countries as the 1970 cohort or, alternatively, refer to the late 1960s cohorts.
Supplement Table S-1 provides more details on available data.
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parity-specific components of fertility decline among women born in 1940–1970. It
first inspects all the 32 countries analysed, grouped into broader regions, and then
focuses on the subset of countries that reached low completed cohort fertility, below
1.75 children per woman. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the main findings.
2. Background: Post-baby boom fertility decline(s)
2.1 Regional diversity in cohort fertility trajectories
Among women born between 1940 and 1970, completed cohort fertility in the
developed countries followed diverse trajectories as it moved towards or below two
children per woman. Most typically, it declined continuously (e.g., in Italy, Spain,
Slovakia,  and  South  Korea),  but  it  also  showed  a  U-shaped  trend  (especially  in  the
United States and Denmark) or an inverted U-shaped trajectory (e.g., in Hungary), with
the timing of these changes varying across countries (Frejka and Calot 2001; Sardon
2006a, 2006b; Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010; Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng 2013).
In the early 1970s cohorts, fertility ranged from 1.4–1.5 children per woman in Spain,
Italy, Ukraine, and Germany to slightly above 2.0 in France, the United States, and
Sweden (Sobotka et al. 2015).
Figure 1 illustrates this diversity for women born between 1940 and 1970 in low
fertility countries, grouped into eight broader regions. The grouping adopted throughout
the study is based on similarities in fertility trends (as seen in Figure 1), and
corresponds to the country classification commonly used in population research (e.g.,
Council of Europe 2005; Frejka and Sardon 2007; Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng
2013). The main characteristics of these country groups in terms of their policies and
broad economic and cultural trends after World War Two are outlined in Section 2.2;
the full list of countries and regions is detailed in the Supplement tables.
In Western and Northern Europe, fertility declined most among women born in the
1940s, and the decline slowed down or ceased among women born in the 1950s and
1960s. In Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the three predominantly German-
speaking countries in Europe, cohort fertility continued declining, reaching the lowest
level of 1.5 in Germany in the late-1960s cohorts. The fall in fertility was even sharper
(and from higher initial values) in Southern Europe: women born in 1970 in Italy and
Spain had on average fewer than 1.5 children. By contrast, most of the former state-
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe already experienced low completed
cohort fertility (1.8–2.0 children per woman) in the early 1940s cohorts. However,
women  born  later  in  the  1940s  and  in  the  1950s  saw  their  fertility  stabilise  or  even
slightly  increase.  The  1960s  cohorts  in  turn  reduced  their  family  size.  Among  the
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countries studied here, Slovakia was a major exception from the broader regional
pattern, with an initial fertility level above 2.5 children per woman.
Figure 1: Completed cohort fertility in the analysed low fertility countries,
grouped by broader regions, women born in 1940–1970
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1 (mostly population censuses or large-scale surveys).
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The English-speaking countries outside Europe retained higher fertility than most
of the other analysed countries. The United States saw a swift reduction in fertility in
the 1940s cohorts, followed by a stabilisation and a gradual increase among women
born between 1955 and 1970, whereas Australia and New Zealand experienced
continuous but less pronounced fertility declines. In East Asia, Japan stands out for
having already reached low fertility of around two children per woman among women
born in the 1930s (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010; not available in our data). Relatively
stable cohort fertility among Japanese women born between 1940 and 1955 was
followed by a renewed fertility decline in the younger birth cohorts, with women born
in 1970 reaching one of the lowest completed cohort fertility levels globally, 1.46.
Singapore experienced a fast transformation from large family size (above 3 children
per woman born in 1940) to very low fertility, reaching similar values as Japan among
women born in the 1960s. South Korea, starting at a high level of 3.9 children per
woman among those born in 1940, appears to have followed a similar trajectory of
fertility decline as Singapore, with a ‘lag’ of about ten cohorts.
2.2 Social, economic, and cultural factor trends affecting cohort fertility in the
post-war era
In the highly developed countries the post-war decades saw a variety of cultural,
economic, and social developments. In the West of Europe and in the English-speaking
non-European countries the generation of women born between 1940 and the mid-
1950s grew up in times of unprecedented economic prosperity. They saw a sharp rise in
their labour force participation (although often on a part-time basis), experienced new
sexual freedom provided by highly effective hormonal contraception, and initiated the
sociocultural changes described as the second demographic transition (Van de Kaa
1987; Lesthaeghe 2010). In the East of Europe the vast majority of women worked full
time. In most of the state-socialist countries, women had only limited access to the
contraceptive pill and relied heavily on abortion (Stloukal 1999). With the exception of
rapidly rising divorce rates in some countries, the new family behaviours and values
spreading in the West remained marginal in Central and Eastern Europe (Sobotka
2011).
Both in the East and in the West, the early baby boomers remained rather
traditional in terms of gender roles and task division within the family: women were
perceived as secondary earners responsible for the housework and, in the West, they
were expected to quit or cut back their paid work once children were born (McDonald
2000). In East Asia, gender and family relations changed very slowly, but the region
was experiencing rapid economic growth and industrialisation (slower in the already
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highly developed Japan) when women born around 1950 were reaching adulthood and
forming their families.
Women born between the mid-1950s and 1970 saw, in their youth, the first post-
war economic recessions (especially the energy crisis in the 1970s), rising
unemployment, and vanishing lifetime jobs (Blossfeld et al. 2005). In the Eastern Bloc
they experienced the collapse of state socialism and across Europe the shrinking of the
welfare state. They also benefited from expanding educational opportunities, including
a gradual rise in university education. In the Western world, people born between the
mid-1950s and 1970 continued the sociocultural changes initiated by the older cohorts,
which resulted in a widening acceptance of less conventional family forms and living
arrangements, including voluntary childlessness (Sobotka and Testa 2008; Merz and
Liefbroer 2012; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2017). These changes also involved
increasing gender equality, especially in the domestic sphere (McDonald 2000). In East
Asia, childbearing remained confined to marriage. The traditional expectations about
women’s role in the family made it difficult for women to continue working after
marriage, despite their increasing education and employment opportunities. This
growing conflict between career opportunities and family life expectations resulted in a
rising rate of nonmarriage (and childlessness), especially among highly educated
women (Jones and Gubhaju 2009; Tsuya 2015; Yoo 2016).
In view of the huge differences in institutional settings across regions and the
rapidly evolving social and economic circumstances in the post-war era, it comes as no
surprise that cohort fertility also followed different pathways across regions and
cohorts. Among women born during and soon after the war (until the mid-1950s),
fertility fell more rapidly in countries where the fertility transition started later and the
share of families with three and more children had remained relatively high, especially
those in Southern Europe or East Asia. Also, in the English-speaking non-European
countries, fertility decreased steeply following the previous great increases in high-
parity births during the baby boom (Van Bavel et al. 2015). The magnitude of the
fertility decline in the cohorts born more recently (from the mid-1950s) has often been
linked to instability in the labour market (Adserà 2004, 2005) and gender inequality in
the family and work spheres (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider,
Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). Except in some post-socialist countries (Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania: see Myrskylä, Goldstein,
and Cheng 2013; Brzozowska 2015; Frejka and Gietel-Basten 2016), the fertility
decline was initially strong and then abated. Based on these analyses of CFR trends and
their driving forces, our analysis divides cohort fertility changes among women born
from 1940 until around 1970 into two parts. Specifically, we contrast the changes that
took place among women born between 1940 and 1955 with the changes occurring
across the next fifteen cohorts, born from 1955 to (around) 1970. As discussed above
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and evidenced in Figure 1, in many countries and regions these two broad cohort
groups witnessed distinct fertility developments, with many countries seeing a shift to
sub-replacement fertility and a slow-down or a stabilisation in their cohort fertility
decline among the cohorts born after 1955. We refer to ‘older’ vs. ‘younger’ cohorts to
distinguish women born between 1940 and 1955 from those born between 1955 and
1970.
2.3 Regional contexts of post-war cohort fertility trends: Which parity was driving
the trend to low fertility?
Although our study is the first to offer a systematic analysis of the parity-specific
components of cohort fertility decline across the developed world, many studies have
addressed the topic for specific countries, regions, and cohort groups. Here we
summarise their findings and, based on this review, specify for each region and broad
cohort which parity progression rate is expected to have been the main driver of the
observed fertility decline among women born in 1940–1970 (Table 1). These
expectations are later addressed in our empirical analysis (Section 4).
The regional differences in policies, economic development, and social trends
correspond to a wide diversity in parity-specific fertility changes across the analysed
regions. In Western and Northern Europe the fertility decrease in the older cohorts was
largely connected to couples limiting their family size to two children and thus reducing
their third and higher-order birth rates (Frejka and Sardon 2007). The broad fertility
stabilisation in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts may not have been dominated by any
specific parity. Relatively good living standards together with well-developed family
policies, most comprehensive in Belgium, France, and the Nordic countries, slowed
down the fall in fertility across all parities, especially in second and third-birth rates
(Toulemon, Pailhé, and Rossier 2008; Andersson et al. 2009; Neels and De Wachter
2010).
In  Austria,  Germany,  and  Switzerland,  strong  work–family  conflict  and  the
associated fall in first-birth rates contributed to the fertility decline among the younger
cohorts analysed (Sobotka 2012; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2017). However, an
analysis of fertility decline among women born in 1940–1965 reveals remarkable
differences between the three countries. In Western Germany, falling first-birth rates
were the key factor, whereas in Austria and Switzerland fertility decline was especially
driven by falling third and higher-order births, and, in Eastern Germany (former GDR),
falling second-birth rates played the main role (Sobotka 2012; see also Bujard and
Sulak 2016).
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In Southern Europe the rapid social and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s
together with the spread of highly effective contraception contributed to strong
reductions  in  the  transition  rates  to  third  and  further  births  among  the  older  cohorts.
Subsequently, in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts, rising women’s employment in
combination with precarious labour market conditions, limited work flexibility for
women, and traditional gender roles within the family depressed second-birth rates
(Adserà 2011) and fuelled further decline in third and higher-order birth rates to very
low levels (Delgado, Meil, and Zamora López 2008; De Rose, Racioppi, and Zanatta
2008).
In Central Europe the almost universal full-time employment of women during
state socialism resulted in very low third-birth rates. In addition, the negative attitudes
towards childlessness (Sobotka and Testa 2008; Merz and Liefbroer 2012) explain why
fertility decline was largely driven by falling second-birth rates, especially in cohorts
bearing children during the state-socialist era (Sobotka 2011). The same factors should
also operate in Eastern Europe. In addition, the lower living standards (especially
among  the  late-1960s  cohorts  who  were  in  their  prime  reproduction  ages  in  the
turbulent period of the 1990s) and relatively poor housing conditions in the region
further depressed second-birth rates (Avdeev and Monnier 1995). Falling transitions to
second birth were the most important ‘determinant’ of completed cohort fertility
decline to very low levels (Frejka and Gietel-Basten 2016). For instance, in Russia four
in ten women born in the late 1960s had only one child (Barkalov 1999; Andreev,
Shkolnikov, and Begun 2002).
In view of their cultural proximity and a similar post-war economic development,
the fertility trends in the English-speaking countries outside Europe resembled those in
Northern and Western Europe. Sharp reductions in third and higher-order birth rates
dominated the fertility decline among women born in the 1940s, i.e., among those who
had children in the 1960s, right after the baby boom era (see Morgan 1996 for the
United States).
Finally, in East Asia, we expect that strong falls in third and higher-order birth
rates fuelled fertility decline among women born in 1940–1955, and that a decrease in
first-birth rates drove the fertility decline among the 1955–1970 cohorts. This region –
especially  Japan –  saw a  sharp  rise  in  childlessness  among women born  in  the  1950s
and 1960s (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010). This trend was partly fuelled by the very
traditional gender role division within marriage (the so-called “marriage package”:
Bumpass et al. 2009; Kim and Cheung 2015), which presumably discouraged many
better-educated women from marrying and having children. In addition, the second and
third-birth rates could have been further suppressed by ‘education fever’, a strong
orientation towards children’s success in life, manifested in the resources and time that
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parents provide for their education, including after-class tutoring (Anderson and Kohler
2012; Tan, Morgan, and Zagheni 2016).
Summing up these region-specific trends, we expect that among women born
between 1940 and 1955 who were of prime childbearing age between 1960 and 1985,
reductions in third and higher-parity progression rates (Table 1) dominated cohort
fertility decline in all regions (except Western Germany). By contrast, among the
younger cohorts born between 1955 and 1970 the picture differs by region. In the
former state-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe the fall in second-birth
rates likely had the strongest impact on overall fertility decline. In Western Europe,
Southern Europe, the three German-speaking countries of Central Europe, and East
Asia we expect the rise in childlessness to play the main role. In the English-speaking
countries outside Europe we reckon that the continuing reductions in third and higher-
order births contributed most to the continuing fertility decline (except in the United
States, where the earlier decline reversed in the post-1950 cohorts). Finally, we do not
formulate any expectations for the Nordic countries, where fertility decline has ended
or slowed down sharply among women born after 1955.
Table 1: Expected dominant parity components of fertility decline among the
older (women born between 1940 and 1955) and younger (women
born between 1955 and 1970) cohorts analysed, by region
Region Cohorts 1940–1955 Cohorts 1955–1970
Eastern Europe PPR23+ PPR12
Central Europe PPR23+ PPR12
Western Europe PPR23+ PPR01
Northern Europe PPR23+ –
German-speaking PPR23+
(PPR01 in W. Germany)
PPR01
Southern Europe PPR23+ PPR01
English-speaking non-European PPR23+ PPR23+
East Asia PPR23+ PPR01
2.4 Shift to very low completed cohort fertility levels
The demographic literature manifests a strong interest in explaining fertility declines to
very low levels, discussing how persistent they are likely to be and pondering their
long-term consequences. We thus pay special attention to analysing which parity
progressions drive cohort fertility decline to very low levels. For period total fertility
(TFR), the thresholds of very low fertility are well established. Very low fertility is
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usually defined as a TFR below 1.5 (e.g., McDonald 2006), whereas ‘lowest-low
fertility’ or ‘ultra-low fertility’ is commonly defined as a TFR falling below 1.3
(Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Jones, Straughan, and Chan 2008). However,
demographers have not yet adopted a common definition of very low cohort fertility.
Because of the tempo distortions negatively affecting period fertility indicators, during
the last four decades cohort fertility in the low fertility countries has typically stayed at
a higher level than the conventional period fertility rates. Two recent contributions, by
Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng (2013) and Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto (2016),
adopt a completed cohort fertility level of 1.75 children per woman as a threshold
below which cohort fertility becomes ‘very low’. We use the same threshold and label
completed cohort fertility below 1.75 as very low.7 Among women born in 1950, cohort
fertility fell below 1.75 children per woman only in Germany (Pötzsch 2016). Later on,
more than ten countries saw their cohort fertility dropping below 1.75, especially
among women born in the early 1960s (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010; Myrskylä,
Goldstein, and Cheng 2013).
The configurations of parity-specific fertility can vary greatly, even when
summing up to similar cohort fertility levels (e.g., to 1.6 children per woman, as in the
example presented in Figure 2). The benchmark combination of generally low parity
progression ratios across all parities can be contrasted with four other hypothetical
combinations: one with high childlessness at 30% (and the corresponding low
progression to first birth, with the PPR01 at  0.70);  another  with  a  strong  one-child
pattern, marked by very low progression to second birth (PPR12 at 0.55); the next one
with a stopping-at-two pattern of very low progression rates to third and fourth births
(PPR23 and PPR34 at 0.15); and, finally, a polarised pattern combining high
childlessness (25%) and a high likelihood of progressing to third or fourth birth (PPR23
and PPR34 at  0.45).  While  we  do  not  expect  any  country  to  fit  any  of  these  stylised
combinations perfectly, we believe they will be useful for discussing parity-specific
fertility trends in the countries with very low fertility.
7 We do not aim to suggest that a ‘very low’ completed cohort fertility of 1.6 or 1.7 is unsustainable or that it
is a reason for serious concern. Rather, we expect that the threshold when fertility is ‘too low’ depends on
many other factors, including migration, economic productivity, health and human capital of the population,
and how societies adjust to the ongoing increase in longevity and population ageing (Striessnig and Lutz
2013; Lee and Mason 2014).
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Figure 2: Possible combinations of parity progression ratios (PPR)
corresponding to a completed cohort fertility of 1.6 children per
woman (an illustration)
Notes: For simplicity, these illustrations limit the family size to a maximum of four children, where PPR34 equals PPR23.
2.5 Research questions
To summarize, we address the following questions and hypotheses:
∂ Differences between cohorts. In the cohorts born between 1940 and 1955 we
expect that the fertility decline was largely driven by the shrinking higher-order
birth rates, manifested by falling progression ratios to third and later births. By
contrast, among women born between 1955 and 1970 the decline in progression to
first and second birth becomes an important driver of their fertility decline.
∂ Differences between wider regions. Are there systematic regional differences in
parity-specific trajectories of cohort fertility decline that mirror broader regional
differences in fertility trends and in the institutional factors affecting them?
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 663
∂ Shift to very low cohort fertility levels. We pay particular attention to countries
that experienced a fall in completed cohort fertility below 1.75 children per
woman. Can we identify systematic differences between countries and regions in
parity-specific pathways to very low completed cohort fertility?
3. Data and methods
We collected data for 32 countries with persistent low fertility. To summarise the key
trends we present some of the results for the eight broader regions specified in Section
2.1  and  Figure  1  (see  also  Supplement  tables  for  further  details).  As  we  use  data  for
women aged 43 and older with almost completed reproductive histories, our analysis
spans birth cohorts from 1940 to 1965–1971. For a few countries we lack data for
several older cohorts and start the analyses with cohorts born between 1941 and 1945.
The averages computed for the regions may thus include a different number of
countries for a few cohorts, depending on data availability. In the decomposition
analysis we look at changes in two broad cohort intervals, women born between
(around) 1940 and 1955 and women born between 1955 and (around) 1970. Japan was
excluded from the analyses of fertility change among older cohorts because data was
only available for women born after 1952. For details on the data sources see
Supplement Table S-1.
Whenever possible we base our analysis on the most recent census data from the
2011 census round, which usually collected information on children ever born among
all women living in a country. Such data is available for 17 countries and comes mostly
from the Cohort Fertility and Education database (CFE 2017; Zeman et al. 2014). Other
data sources include large-scale surveys (merged Enquête Famille et Logements
surveys from 1982, 1990, 1999, and 2011 for France, and Famiglie e soggetti sociali
2003 and 2009 for Italy), microcensus data (2012 round for Germany8), and other
sources provided by the national statistical offices (ONS 2014 for England and Wales).
We also utilise data from population registers (Denmark, Finland, Norway, the
Netherlands, and Sweden) and the Human Fertility Database (HFD 2017),9 which
contains data from the censuses around 2001, supplemented by fertility rates for the
subsequent period 2013–2014 (Austria, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine). For Japan and
the  United  States,  where  more  recent  census  data  does  not  provide  information  on
8 We show data for Western Germany, i.e., the former Federal Republic of Germany excluding Berlin. We do
not present data for Eastern Germany (including Berlin) as the sample size is too small and the resulting
indicators of cohort fertility and parity distribution are not robust.
9 The HFD data was extracted from the respective files on female population exposure by parity in the input
data section *exposRRpa.txt, where * stands for country code.
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women’s parity, cohort fertility is reconstructed from period age-specific fertility rates
by birth order using the HFD methodology (Jasilioniene et al. 2015).
By using census and large-scale survey or register data we cover the number of
children ever born to women living in each country at the time of the census or survey.
Relying on this retrospective data provides more stable and often more reliable
information on family size distribution than the cohort fertility data reconstructed from
the long-term series of period indicators that dominated research on cohort fertility in
the past (see the methods section in Council of Europe 2005 and Calot and Sardon 2004
for the information on the computation of cohort indicators provided by the European
Demographic Observatory). Cohort measures reconstructed from period fertility rates
are very sensitive to the quality of birth order reporting in vital statistics, and also to the
reliability of past population estimates by age and sex. Furthermore, period data only
contains records of births that took place within a country, the reproductive histories of
immigrants before their arrival date being ignored. The cohort fertility histories created
in this way are somewhat artificial and may not reflect the actual childlessness of
residents in countries with high immigration or emigration. Different methods used for
estimating completed cohort fertility can also explain some of the differences10 between
our indicators and those based on period series, published in Frejka and Calot 2001,
Council of Europe 2005, Sardon 2006a, 2006b, Frejka and Sardon 2007, and Myrskylä,
Goldstein, and Cheng 2013.
In the late-1960s birth cohorts, 13 out of 32 countries analysed here had fertility
below 1.75 (see Figure 1). Except for Slovenia, they belong to four of the eight
analysed regions: Eastern Europe (Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine), Southern
Europe (Greece, Italy, and Spain), ‘German-speaking countries’ (Austria, Germany,
and Switzerland), and East Asia (Japan and Singapore). Two of these countries, Greece
and Slovenia, only reached a completed cohort fertility level below 1.75 in the latest
cohort observed in our data. Therefore, our analysis of cohort fertility decline to very
low levels focuses on the remaining 11 countries.
We measure the cohort fertility level with the completed cohort fertility rate
(CFR), and decompose its change between the initial and final birth cohorts into the
changes in the parity progression ratios (PPRi-1,i). The PPRi-1,i expresses the probability
of reaching parity i among women of parity i-1 (see Table 2 for average CFR and PPRs
in the early-1940s, 1955, and the late-1960s birth cohorts in the analysed regions). For
each birth cohort analysed, the CFR can be defined as the sum of parity-specific CFRi:
10 The discrepancy between the CFR levels published by Sardon (2006a, 2006b), Council of Europe (2005)
and those presented in our paper is relatively small. In most countries the CFR for the cohorts born in 1940,
1955, and around 1970 was slightly higher (by up to 0.1 children per woman) in our data. However, for four
countries – Bulgaria, Belarus, France, and New Zealand – our indicators show significantly lower CFR (by
0.1–0.3 births per woman).
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CFR = 	∑ CFR୧୧       (1)
where CFRi is the average number of children of birth order i born to women from a
given cohort. It relates the number of women who reached parity i or higher to the total
number of women in that cohort.
The parity progression ratios to first birth and to higher birth orders are given as:PPR଴,ଵ = CFRଵ,	 (2)PPR୧ିଵ,୧ = େ୊ୖ౟େ୊ୖ౟షభ 	for	i > 1.	 (3)
We combine data on fourth and further births together, computing an indicator of
the progression rate from the third and higher-order births to the fourth and higher-
order births:PPRଷା,ସା = େ୊ୖరశେ୊ୖయశ (4)
It also holds that:CFR୧ = ∏ PPR୨ିଵ,୨୧୨ୀଵ (5)
We  decompose  changes  in  the  CFR  into  the  contribution  of  changes  in  the
transition to first birth (dPPR01), second birth (dPPR12), and third and higher-order
births (dPPR23+). The decomposition method we employ proceeds directly from
Barkalov (1999; formulae [3–6] on pp. 52–53) and takes into account the sequential
nature  of  childbearing  as  a  chain  of  transitions  across  parities,  starting  from  the
transition to first birth and then proceeding to subsequent parity transitions (see
Appendix of Zeman et al. 2017 for the method details). The underlying idea is that the
change in the progression rate to a given parity i affects not only the number of women
in this parity but also all the higher-parity distributions.11 The difference between CFR
in initial cohort c1 and in final cohort c2 is expressed as:
11 Consider, for instance, a hypothetical case of a population where women have three children at most and
each parity progression rate (PPR01, PPR12, and PPR23) is fixed at 0.8. The total share of women with three
children is then computed as 0.80 * 0.80 * 0.80 = 0.512. If the first birth progression rate, PPR01, falls to 0.6,
this will not only affect the number of women having a first birth, but, assuming the other progression rates
remain  the  same,  it  will  also  lower  the  share  of  women with  three  children,  computed  as  0.6  *  0.8  *  0.8  =
0.384.
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
666 http://www.demographic-research.org
CFRୡଶ − CFRୡଵ = ∑ ൤൬େ୊ୖ౟ౙమ
େ୊ୖ౟
ౙభ −
େ୊ୖ౟శభ
ౙమ
େ୊ୖ౟శభ
ౙభ ൰∑ CFR୨ୡଵ୨ୀଵ ൨୧ 	       (6)
The relationship between completed cohort fertility rate and parity progression
ratios is expressed as:CFR = PPR଴,ଵ + PPR଴,ଵ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶ + PPR଴,ଵ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶ ∗ PPRଶ,ଷ + PPR଴,ଵ ∗ 	PPRଵ,ଶ ∗PPRଶ,ଷ ∗ ୔୔ୖయశ,రశଵି୔୔ୖయశ,రశ       (7)
In  order  to  estimate  the  contribution  of  changes  in  PPR01, PPR12, and PPR23 and
higher to the overall change in the CFR between two cohorts, changes in parity
progression ratios are considered stepwise, from lower to higher parities. We analyse
the contribution of changes in each progression rate between the two cohorts compared,
c1 and c2, by fixing the values of the subsequent progressions to higher parities at the
level of the initial cohort, c1.
This is done directly within the completed cohort fertility rates. Thus, under the
condition of fixed PPR1,2 and higher, the completed cohort fertility rate is computed as:CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଵାୡଵ,ୡଶ = PPR଴,ଵୡଶ + PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଵ + PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଵ ∗ PPRଶ,ଷୡଵ +
	PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଵ ∗ PPRଶ,ଷୡଵ ∗ PPRଷା,ସାୡଵ /(1− PPRଷା,ସାୡଵ )    (8)
Completed cohort fertility rate under the condition of fixed PPR2,3 and higher is
computed as:CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଶାୡଵ,ୡଶ = PPR଴,ଵୡଶ + PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଶ + PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଶ ∗ 	PPRଶ,ଷୡଵ +PPR଴,ଵୡଶ ∗ PPRଵ,ଶୡଶ ∗ PPRଶ,ଷୡଵ ∗ PPRଷା,ସାୡଵ /(1− PPRଷା,ସାୡଵ )       (9)
Using these results, we compute the contribution of changes in each parity-
progression ratio, dPPR୲ିଵ.୧ୡଵ,ୡଶ, to the overall change in completed cohort fertility rate
(equations 10–12). We calculate the contribution of the change in first-birth and
second-birth progression rates and the contribution of the change in progression rates to
third, fourth, and higher parities, using the ‘frozen’ completed cohort fertility rates in
equations (8) and (9).dPPR଴,ଵୡଵ,ୡଶ = CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଵାୡଵ,ୡଶ − CFRୡଵ     (10)
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dPPRଵ,ଶୡଵ,ୡଶ = CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଶାୡଵ,ୡଶ − CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଵାୡଵ,ୡଶ     (11)dPPRଶ,ଷାୡଵ,ୡଶ = CFRୡଶ − CFR୤୧୶୔୔ୖଶାୡଵ,ୡଶ     (12)
To simplify the discussion of the contribution of change in PPRs to the CFR, we
do not detail the contribution of declining parity progression ratios after the third birth,
which had relatively small influence in most of the analysed countries, especially
among the younger cohorts. We use the indicator dPPR23+ defined in equation (12),
which includes the combined effects of changes in progression rates to third birth and to
fourth and later births.
A similar method of decomposing the differences in total fertility rate into the
contribution of individual parity-progression ratios was developed by Ní Bhrolcháin
(1987) and Pullum, Tedrow, and Herting (1989), extended further by Barkalov (1999),
and formalised by Das Gupta (1993, example 3.7, pp. 33–35). Later, Andreev,
Shkolnikov, and Begun (2002) proposed a more general method and developed the
algorithm of a stepwise replacement as a universal tool for the decomposition of
differences between values of aggregate measures by age and other demographic
dimensions. They concluded that their general replacement method is more exact than
Barkalov’s method, which we use in this paper. However, the difference between the
two methods in our decomposition results was relatively small12 and we opted for using
the simpler and intuitively easy to understand method of Barkalov.
The decomposition approach presented here entails some information loss: we
analyse changes between only three cohorts (1940, 1955, and 1970) without examining
cohort-to-cohort trends in detail, and we cluster countries into regions, even though
fertility trajectories between countries within each region differ in some cases.
However, analysing long-series data from many countries requires simplifications in
order to summarise the observed changes and to find general patterns and mechanisms
explaining the observed trends. Even when some regions include outliers in terms of
their completed cohort fertility levels and trends (Slovakia, Ireland, Greece, United
States), the parity-specific fertility patterns in these countries are still closer to other
countries in the region than to other regions. Our analysis also confirmed that the
dynamics of parity-specific fertility changes and the resulting contribution of different
parities to the decline in completed fertility in these countries mostly followed the
12 To assess the sensitivity of the presented results to the analytical method chosen here, we also computed the
alternative decomposition of the CFR decline for two countries, Italy and South Korea, using the method by
Andreev, Shkolnikov, and Begun (2002). The resulting difference was relatively small, with the latter method
showing a stronger impact of declining second-birth rates (PPR12) and a weaker impact of third and higher-
order parity progression ratios on the observed overall cohort fertility decline, and the direction and relative
importance of distinct parities was comparable. Results are available from the first author upon request.
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trends in broader regions to which they belong (see Table S-1). As we demonstrate in
the next section, the regional approach we adopted for much of our analyses allows us
to identify distinct patterns of cohort fertility change and its parity components in these
broader country groups. The link between these patterns and the institutional and
socioeconomic context cannot be established as rigorously as in advanced statistical
modelling. However, our comprehensive methodological approach allows us to draw
firm conclusions when keeping a balance between making generalisations and
acknowledging particularities and nuances.
Table 2: Completed cohort fertility among women born around 1940, 1955,
and 1970 and parity progression ratios, by broad regions
Region Cohort range CFR PPR0,1 PPR1,2 PPR2,3 PPR3+,4+
Eastern Europe 1940–1945 1.86 0.93 0.73 0.24 0.34
1955 1.84 0.93 0.75 0.20 0.30
1966–1968 1.64 0.91 0.63 0.19 0.31
Central Europe 1940 2.05 0.92 0.77 0.36 0.38
1955 1.97 0.92 0.79 0.30 0.31
1968 1.86 0.89 0.74 0.31 0.33
Western Europe 1940–1941 2.56 0.88 0.86 0.57 0.49
1955 2.15 0.85 0.84 0.48 0.41
1966–1971 1.93 0.83 0.80 0.43 0.36
Northern Europe 1940 2.19 0.89 0.84 0.47 0.36
1955 1.99 0.86 0.81 0.41 0.33
1966–1971 2.00 0.86 0.82 0.41 0.34
German-speaking 1940–1944 1.99 0.86 0.77 0.43 0.39
1955 1.76 0.82 0.74 0.37 0.34
1965–1969 1.64 0.78 0.74 0.33 0.33
Southern Europe 1940 2.23 0.87 0.85 0.47 0.42
1955 1.90 0.88 0.79 0.33 0.30
1968–1970 1.57 0.80 0.73 0.21 0.33
English-speaking 1940–1943 2.58 0.91 0.89 0.59 0.44
non-European 1955 2.15 0.85 0.83 0.49 0.39
1967–1968 2.05 0.85 0.81 0.46 0.39
East Asia
(without Japan)
1940–1941 3.40 0.95 0.93 0.79 0.55
East Asia 1955 2.03 0.88 0.86 0.40 0.25
East Asia 1966–1969 1.68 0.81 0.79 0.30 0.22
Note: The list of countries belonging to the regions and the exact cohort range available for each country as well as data sources are
listed in the Supplement Table S-1. Regional values are calculated as nonweighted averages using the 1940 cohort (or earliest
available) and the 1970 cohort (or the latest available) for each country.
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4. Results
4.1 Changes in parity progression ratios and regional patterns of fertility decline
Low transition rates to second and third births explain why cohort fertility in Eastern
Europe and, to a smaller extent, in Central Europe was lower than in other regions in
the early-1940s birth cohorts. In Eastern Europe the progression to third birth declined
slowly but steadily, remaining the lowest of all the regions until the mid-1960s cohorts,
when Southern Europe experienced plummeting third-birth rates, eventually reaching
equally low values (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Parity progression ratios to first (PPR01), second (PPR12), and third
birth (PPR23), women born in 1940 to 1970 (regional means)
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Figure 3: (Continued)
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1.
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German-speaking countries exhibited the highest levels of childlessness among the
analysed cohorts, followed by Southern Europe and East Asia in the 1960s cohorts. The
first two regions also had low transition rates to second birth. While in the German-
speaking countries second-birth rates stabilised at a low level, in Southern Europe they
raced continuously down, coinciding with a steep decline in the progression to third
birth.
The development of parity transitions in Western and Northern Europe were
comparable to that of the English-speaking non-European countries. In all three regions
the largest falls in parity progression ratios took place between the 1940 and 1955 birth
cohorts. The levels of childlessness varied greatly, with lower values in the United
States, Scandinavia, and France and higher shares in Finland (which was very similar to
England and Wales with respect to all indicators), Ireland, and the Netherlands (see
Supplement Table S-1). The progression to third birth remained substantially higher in
the English-speaking non-European countries than in Western and Northern Europe,
while the transition rates to second birth eventually converged in these regions.
In East Asia, rapid declines across all parity progression ratios took place among
the analysed cohorts, starting from very high levels among women born in the early
1950s and reaching low values among those born in 1965. Although comprising only
three countries in our dataset, the region shows immense diversity, especially in
childlessness rates, which increased dramatically in Japan and Singapore but only
moderately in South Korea, where they remained below 10%.
4.2 Decomposition of fertility decline using parity progression ratios
The decomposition of fertility trends into the contribution of changes in parity
progression ratio to first (dPPR01), second (dPPR12), and third and later births
(dPPR23+; Figure 4) allows us to quantify which parity was driving the fertility decline
in the different cohorts, countries, and regions analysed. Overall, the results confirm our
general expectations: The fertility decline among women born between 1940 and 1955
was  mostly  driven  by  the  decreasing  transition  to  higher-order  births,  whereas  the
change among the younger cohorts born between 1955 and 1970 was mostly due to
falling transitions to first and second births, though showing striking regional
differences.
In the older cohorts, fertility rates declined dramatically in East Asia (taking into
account only Singapore and South Korea; data for Japan was not available) and in
Southern Europe (Figure 1). In both regions about two-thirds of this fall was due to
reductions in the progression ratio to third and later births (Figure 4). The English-
speaking non-European countries also experienced a substantial fertility decline (by
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0.43 children per women), but it resulted equally from increasing childlessness and
declining third and higher-order progression rates, with a smaller contribution of
decreasing second-birth progression rate. Similar changes in parity progression ratios
took place in the German-speaking countries, but they were moderate, leading to a
fertility decline of 0.23 children per woman. In Western Europe, cohort fertility fell by
0.41 children per woman, of which 0.28 – or two-thirds – was accounted for by the
decline in higher parity births. Finally, Central and Eastern Europe experienced only a
modest fertility decline of 0.08 and 0.03 respectively, which was entirely driven by the
fall in third and higher-order progression rates. These were the only regions in which
women born between 1940 and 1955 experienced an increase in the transition to second
birth.
Fertility decline was weaker among women born between 1955 and around 1970
in all regions except Eastern and Central Europe, and resulted mostly from decreases in
parity progression ratios to first and second births. However, the role of each of these
transitions differed widely across regions. The sharp fall in second-birth progression
rate in Eastern Europe accounted for three-quarters of the CFR drop of 0.20 children
per woman. In Central Europe the fertility decline was more moderate (–0.11), but it
was also mostly driven by falling second-birth rates, with childlessness playing a
smaller role (Figure 4).
By contrast, in Western Europe and the English-speaking non-European countries
the decrease in CFR resulted equally from declines in PPR01, PPR12, and PPR23, or
higher. A CFR drop of 0.13 in the German-speaking countries was caused mostly by
the increase in childlessness. Southern Europe and East Asia saw the largest fertility
reductions, by 0.33 or 0.35 children per woman, resulting primarily from rises in
childlessness (which constituted almost 60% of the overall fall in fertility) and
decreases in second-birth rates, and only marginally from reductions in higher-order
births.
In the Nordic countries, fertility hardly changed (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) or
even increased (Denmark). In the United States fertility increased, unlike in Australia
and New Zealand, mostly as a result of elevated transitions to first and third birth
(Supplement Table S-1).
Despite the large degree of coherence within the regions, some countries deviated
from their region’s pattern. The most striking example is Ireland, where fertility
dropped by 0.78 children per woman between the 1940 and 1955 cohorts – the steepest
fall  in  Europe  –  and  where  the  decline  was  almost  exclusively  driven  by  the  falling
progression rates among women with two or more children (Supplement Table S-1).
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Figure 4: Contribution of changes in parity progression ratio to first (dPPR01),
second (dPPR12), and higher order births (dPPR23+) to the decline in
completed cohort fertility among women born between (around)
1940 and 1955 (left-hand bars) and between 1955 and (around) 1970
(right-hand bars), by region
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1.
4.3 Fertility decline below 1.75 children per woman
Countries in which fertility declined below 1.75 children per woman for at least two
successive cohorts belong to four regions: Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, the
German-speaking countries, and East Asia (see details in Table 3, Figure 5, and
Figure 6).
In most countries, fertility fell below this threshold among women born in the
early 1960s. Women in Western Germany born in 1950 were the first to experience
such low fertility, but the pace of the subsequent fertility decline was slow there,
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reaching the level of 1.53 children per woman in the late-1960s cohorts. By contrast, in
Italy and Spain fertility fell much more quickly: the CFR declined on average by 0.02–
0.03 per cohort, heading towards the level of 1.5 in the late-1960s cohorts. However,
nowhere did the fertility decline proceed as fast as in Japan. Within seven birth cohorts,
fertility in Japan dropped by 0.25 children per woman, falling to 1.49 in the 1969
cohort.
Table 3: Key indicators of cohort fertility decline to very low levels; countries
with completed cohort fertility below 1.75 children per woman
Country CFR, 1955
cohort
First cohort
below 1.75
Last cohort
observed
CFR dCFR Number of
cohorts
dCFR per
cohort
Austria 1.81 1961 1967 1.67 -0.07 6 -0.012
Bulgaria 1.83 1961 1968 1.57 -0.17 7 -0.024
Belarus 1.77 1958 1966 1.56 -0.17 8 -0.022
Switzerland 1.79 1963 1965 1.70 -0.04 2 -0.020
W. Germany 1.71 1950 1969 1.53 -0.19 19 -0.010
Spain 1.91 1960 1968 1.52 -0.22 8 -0.028
Italy 1.83 1959 1970 1.49 -0.23 11 -0.021
Japan 1.98 1962 1969 1.49 -0.25 7 -0.036
Russia 1.88 1964 1967 1.66 -0.07 3 -0.024
Singapore 1.91 1964 1966 1.66 -0.07 2 -0.035
Ukraine 1.88 1963 1968 1.61 -0.13 5 -0.026
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1.
The decomposition of the overall CFR decline (Figure 5) reveals that parity-
specific fertility declines from 1.75 children per woman to very low levels followed
trajectories typical of the corresponding regions. In the Eastern European countries the
fertility decline was driven primarily by the falling transition from first to second birth.
By contrast, in all other countries except Switzerland increasing childlessness levels
played the main role (Figure 5 and Figure 6). Decreases in progression rates to second
birth were also pronounced in Spain, Switzerland, Japan, and Singapore, but they
contributed less to the overall fall in the CFR there than in Eastern Europe. In Austria
and Switzerland the decline in transition to third and later births also contributed to the
observed fertility decrease.
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Figure 5: Average contribution of changes in parity progression ratio to first
(dPPR01), second (dPPR12), and further birth (dPPR23+) to the decline
in completed cohort fertility in countries with the CFR below 1.75
(per each birth cohort with fertility below this level)
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1.
Despite reaching similar fertility levels, the very low fertility regions clearly differ
in their parity progression ratios. Figure 6 illustrates this diversity by comparing parity
progression ratios among women born in 1955 (when only Western Germany recorded
cohort fertility below 1.75) and in 1970. In both cohorts the German-speaking countries
show low (and further declining) first-birth rates combined with relatively high and
stable second-birth rates and moderately high third-birth rates. In terms of their parity
composition they resemble the polarised pattern in Figure 2. Southern Europe,
represented by Italy and Spain, combines two stylised configurations, the benchmark
pattern in the older birth cohort and the stopping-at-two pattern in the younger one,
showing a fall in progression rates across all parities, especially in third-birth rates.
Eastern Europe shows a steep decrease in second-birth rates combined with very low
and slightly declining third-birth rates, but persistently high first-birth rates. This
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combination embodies first the stopping-at-two pattern, and then the one-child pattern
depicted in Figure 2. Finally, in East Asia each progression rate fell to low levels, with
first and second-birth trajectories moving in tandem. There, the combination of parity
progression ratios did not strictly correspond to one of our stylised combinations, but
moved towards a mix of the high childlessness and one-child configurations. Besides
Switzerland, these are the only countries where progression to first birth reached as low
levels as the second-birth progression rates.
The various changes in parity-specific transition rates resulted in distinct parity
compositions. While most of the very low fertility regions have experienced high and
increasing childlessness, Eastern Europe is characterised by a high proportion of one-
child families, quickly increasing at the expense of families with two and more children
(see Appendix Figure A-1 in Zeman et al. 2017).
Figure 6: Parity progression ratios to first, second, and third birth (PPR01,
PPR12, and PPR23) in eleven countries that reached a CFR below
1.75; women born in 1955 and around 1970
Note: The last cohort available (1965 to 1970) differs by country; see more precise specification in Table 3.
Source: Own calculations based on sources listed in the Supplement Table S-1.
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5. Discussion: The regional context of cohort fertility declines
Our study provides a systematic analysis of the parity components of cohort fertility
decline in the low fertility countries among women born between 1940 and 1970. The
fall  in  fertility  among  the  older  cohorts  analysed,  born  between  1940  and  1955,  was
mostly driven by reductions in the progression ratios to third and higher-order births. It
was also stronger in countries where the fertility transition started later, especially in
Ireland, Spain, and East Asia. Only a few countries deviated from these broader
regional patterns, with the fall in first-birth rates (and the concomitant rise in
childlessness) dominating the fertility decline in Western Germany, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands.
Among women born between 1955 and 1970 the fertility decline slowed down in
most regions except Southern and Central Europe, where it continued, and in Eastern
Europe, where it accelerated in connection with the turbulent social and economic
transition after the collapse of state socialism. We have identified distinct regional
trajectories of fertility change, which were also manifested in the countries and regions
that saw their CFR falling to very low levels of below 1.75 children per woman.
Clearly, countries and regions followed different pathways towards very low fertility,
broadly confirming our hypotheses sketched in Table 1. The main distinction can be
drawn between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the fertility decline
was primarily driven by falling second-birth rates, and the German-speaking countries,
Southern Europe, and East Asia, where the fall in first-birth rates was more relevant. In
the Nordic countries and the United States, fertility broadly stabilised or increased,
while the fertility declines in Western Europe and in Australia and New Zealand were
driven equally by relatively minor changes across all parity-specific transition rates.
Thus, in two broad regions – Western Europe and English-speaking countries outside
Europe – our parity-specific predictions were not supported by the empirical data.
The fact that the regional trends in parity progression ratios differed from each
other, even in regions with similarly low cohort fertility, suggests that there is no
uniform explanation of low fertility that fits all low fertility countries (see also Rindfuss
and Choe 2015). Here we summarise the key differences between regions and discuss
selected region-specific factors that were arguably important in the later phase of the
observed cohort fertility decline, i.e., among women born after 1955.
Among women born in the 1960s, the highest fertility and highest proportion of
large families was found in English-speaking countries outside Europe and in Western
and Northern Europe. In England and Wales and the United States these relatively high
fertility levels partly arise from social polarisation in fertility (Ekkert-Jaffé et al. 2002;
Sardon 2006a, 2006b): relatively high childlessness among women with a university
degree contrasts with a high share of large families among the lower-educated
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(Berrington, Stone, and Beaujouan 2015; Schoen 2006). This pattern is partly driven by
unplanned pregnancies, which are most common among lower-educated women
(Musick et al. 2009). In the United States these women consequently have more
children than they intended (Morgan and Rackin 2010).
Western and Northern Europe together with the English-speaking non-European
countries are the most gender-equal regions globally, whose institutional arrangements
make it “easier, not easy” (Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016: 1) for women to
combine work and family. The most developed work- and family- friendly policies with
generous family transfers, high level of childcare coverage, and policies promoting
work-family balance are found in the Nordic countries (Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-
Otto 2016) and in some countries of Western Europe, especially France (Klüsener,
Neels, and Kreyenfeld 2013). There, the family-friendly policies have nurtured and
maintained positive attitudes towards larger families (Toulemon, Pailhé, and Rossier
2008). In the Netherlands the male breadwinner model is still widely accepted but the
labour market offers abundant and rewarding part-time job opportunities (Mills 2015).
Thus, it is not surprising that in these countries no major change in the structure of the
families was observed, but rather a smooth and moderate change in cohort fertility
across all parities.
By contrast, childlessness levels in the German-speaking countries and Southern
Europe became higher than in other regions. However, the trends in higher-order
transitions increasingly diverged between these two regions, with German-speaking
countries showing a more polarised pattern marked by more frequent transitions to third
and later births, and Southern Europe displaying a continuing fall to very low third and
higher-order birth rates. In the German-speaking countries, traditional social
expectations towards mothers remained strong in the analysed cohorts: Working outside
home when children are small is widely perceived as harmful to the children’s
development (Klüsener, Neels, and Kreyenfeld 2013) and, in line with that, public
childcare for children below age three was very limited until recently (with the
exception of Eastern Germany; e.g., Leitner 2010). Perhaps this is why low-family-size
ideals, “child-free lifestyles”, and the “culture of childlessness” gained greater
popularity in Germany than in any other country (Sobotka and Testa 2008; Klüsener,
Neels, and Kreyenfeld 2013; Burkimsher and Zeman 2017). In Italy, childcare still
relies strongly on traditional family organisation (e.g., grand-parents taking care of the
children), which has been weakening recently (De Rose, Racioppi, and Zanatta 2008).
Childcare facilities for preschool children are not compatible with full-time
employment of both parents, and women who want to pursue a professional career
often have to forgo motherhood. In addition, the chronically high unemployment and
unstable labour markets in Southern Europe, especially for young people, have been
accompanied by a late leaving of the parental home and fertility postponement,
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 679
contributing to high childlessness and generally low levels of fertility (Adserà 2005; De
Rose, Racioppi, and Zanatta 2008).
In Central and Eastern Europe, fertility fell mostly due to the declining transition
to second child, while third-birth rates remained low, which contrasted with these
regions having the highest first-birth rates among all those analysed and their
continuing negative attitudes to childlessness (Sobotka and Testa 2008; Merz and
Liefbroer 2012). Especially highly educated women often choose to have only one
child to satisfy the social norm of becoming a mother, while at the same time limiting
the inevitable double burden of working full-time and taking care of household tasks
(Frejka 2008; Brzozowska 2015). The transition to a market economy, new economic
uncertainties, and relatively low wages together with traditional gender roles within the
family have contributed to the continuously rising share of one-child families, with the
second-birth progression ratio in Eastern Europe falling to or below 0.6. This
development has been strengthened by the ‘failure’ of many couples to realise their
childbearing intentions (Spéder and Kapitány 2014). The rise in one-child families has
been particularly dramatic in Eastern Europe, which is economically weaker and
suffered a turbulent social and economic transition in the 1990s (e.g., Philipov, Spéder,
and Billari 2006; Sobotka 2011).
East Asia has experienced the most rapid shift from high to very low fertility
levels among the analysed regions. Among women born after 1955 this decline was
fuelled by a fall across all parity progression ratios, with South Korea lagging behind in
the first-birth decline. The whole region has undergone a rapid transformation towards
high education and rising career aspirations among younger men and women, combined
with long working hours and a competitive labour market (see contributions in Rindfuss
and Choe 2015).  At  the  same time,  gender  roles  within  the  family  have  remained far
more traditional than in Europe (Jones, Straughan, and Chan 2008) and, until recently,
family policies mostly focused on financial incentives that did not promote the
reconciliation of work and family. For women, having children usually implies quitting
the labour market (Ma 2014; Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016). In addition, the
social pressure to invest in children’s education is stronger than anywhere else in the
world, further nurturing the trend towards higher childlessness and more one-child
families.
In the countries where fertility fell  below 1.75 children per woman, the trends in
parity-specific fertility rates correspond to those seen in the wider regions to which they
belong. German-speaking countries, Southern Europe, Japan, and Singapore report low
first-birth rates and high levels of childlessness, whereas the lowest-fertility countries in
Central and Eastern Europe display a sharp fall in second-birth rates. This evidence
suggests that even a fall to very low fertility levels takes diverse trajectories across
countries and is likely fuelled by a mix of different institutional conditions rather than a
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uniform set of factors. However, most of the lowest-fertility countries remain strongly
gender-unequal, fostering the traditional male-breadwinner model and not actively
supporting the reconciliation of work and family (Esping-Andersen 2009). The strong
increase in very small families (0 or 1 child) in all these countries lends support to the
idea that gender systems are “critical components” in explaining fertility levels and
differentials (McDonald 2000, 2006; Esping-Andersen 2009; Esping-Andersen and
Billari 2015; Baizán, Arpino, and Delclòs 2016). The next key factor is economic
uncertainty, which has been affecting the fertility decisions of younger cohorts,
especially in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe.
How will the fertility trends develop among women born in the 1970s and the
early 1980s? In Central and Eastern Europe, childlessness is likely to start rising faster
than in the previous cohorts because of educational expansion and the progressive
westernisation of lifestyles. This includes rising aspirations regarding self-realisation,
living standards, and parenting, and new structural constraints such as unstable labour
markets and costly housing leading to a late departure from the parental home,
documented for the region since the 1990s (e.g., Sobotka 2011; Frejka and Gietel-
Basten 2016). One-child families are set to become yet more prevalent in Central
Europe. Similarly, in Southern Europe and East Asia we expect further increases in
childlessness and a more pronounced shift to one-child families. In the other regions the
available data and projections suggest a broad stabilisation of cohort fertility among
women born in the 1970s (Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng 2013), which indicates that
parity-specific fertility is also likely to remain similar to that observed in the late 1960s
cohorts.
However, future fertility trends will be conditioned by the social reaction to the
continuous decrease in fertility among women born in 1940–1970. In East Asia, future
fertility will be affected by change (or its lack) in its rigid labour markets and its
strongly unbalanced gender relations. In Eastern Europe, cohort fertility trends partly
depend on the effectiveness of pro-natalist measures implemented particularly by the
Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian governments in the 2000s, which targeted
especially second and third births, and which have had a mixed effect so far (for Russia,
see Frejka and Zakharov 2013; Biryukova, Sinyavskaya, and Nurimanova 2016). In the
German-speaking countries, especially Austria and Germany, more flexible parental
leave schemes and the expansion of early childcare provision may help to achieve a
modest upturn in cohort fertility, possibly even heralding a decline in childlessness in
the  region.  Finally,  in  Southern  Europe  the  share  of  larger  families  is  already so  low
that it cannot decline much further. However, a further shift towards higher
childlessness and more one-child families is likely, considering that the whole region
has been strongly hit by the recent economic recession. Future cohort fertility trends
will be affected by the pace of the economic recovery, as well as by the progress of
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labour market reforms in creating more career opportunities, more stable employment
for the young, and a more gender-equal social and work environment.
6. Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the European Research Council under the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ERC Grant agreement
n°284238 (EURREP project). An earlier, extended version of this study is available as a
working paper (Zeman et al. 2017). We are thankful to Daniel Devolder, Vladimir M.
Shkolnikov, and three anonymous reviewers for comments that helped us improve this
study.
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
682 http://www.demographic-research.org
References
Adserà, A. (2004). Changing fertility rates in developed countries. The impact of labour
market institutions. Journal of Population Economics 17(1): 1–27. doi:10.1007/
s00148-003-0166-x.
Adserà, A. (2005). Vanishing children: From high unemployment to low fertility in
developed countries. American Economic Review 95(2): 189–193. doi:10.1257/
000282805774669763.
Adserà, A. (2011). Where are the babies? Labor market conditions and fertility in
Europe. European Journal of Population 27(1): 1–32. doi:10.1007/s10680-010-
9222-x.
Anderson, T. and Kohler, H.-P. (2012). Education fever and the East Asian fertility
puzzle:  A case  study of  low fertility  in  South  Korea. Asian Population Studies
9(2): 196–215. doi:10.1080/17441730.2013.797293.
Andersson, G., Rønsen, M., Knudsen, L.B., Lappegård, T., Neyer, G., Skrede, K.,
Teschner, K., and Vikat, A. (2009). Cohort fertility patterns in the Nordic
countries. Demographic Research 20(14): 313–352. doi:10.4054/DemRes.
2009.20.14.
Avdeev, A. and Monnier, A. (1995). A survey of modern Russian fertility. Population:
An English Selection 7: 1–38.
Andreev, E.M., Shkolnikov, V.M., and Begun, A.Z. (2002). Algorithm for
decomposition of differences between aggregate demographic measures and its
application to life expectancies, healthy life expectancies, parity-progression
ratios, and total fertility rates. Demographic Research 7(14): 499–522.
doi:10.4054/DemRes.2002.7.14.
Baizán, P., Arpino, B., and Delclòs, C.E. (2016). The effect of gender policies on
fertility: The moderating role of education and normative context. European
Journal of Population 32(1): 1–30. doi:10.1007/s10680-015-9356-y.
Barkalov, N.B. (1999). The fertility decline in Russia, 1989–1996: A view with period
parity-progression ratios. Genus 55(3–4): 11–60.
Beaujouan, É., Brzozowska, Z., and Zeman, K. (2016). Childlessness trends in
twentieth century Europe: Limited link to growing educational attainment.
Population Studies 70(3): 275–291. doi:10.1080/00324728.2016.1206210.
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 683
Berrington, A., Stone, J., and Beaujouan, É. (2015). Educational differences in timing
and quantum of childbearing in Britain: A study of cohorts born 1940–1969.
Demographic Research 33(26): 733–764. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2015.33.26.
Billari, F.C. and Kohler, H.-P. (2004). Patterns of low and very low fertility in Europe.
Population Studies 58(2): 161–176. doi:10.1080/0032472042000213695.
Biryukova, S., Sinyavskaya, O., and Nurimanova, I. (2016). Estimating effects of 2007
family policy changes on probability of second and subsequent births in Russia.
Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics (Working
paper WP BRP 68/SOC/2016).
Blossfeld, H.-P., Klijzing, E., Mills, M., and Kurz, K. (2005). Globalization,
uncertainty, and youth in society: The losers in a globalizing world. New York:
Routledge.
Bongaarts, J. and Sobotka, T. (2012). A demographic explanation for the recent rise in
European fertility. Population and Development Review 38(1): 83–120.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00473.x.
Brzozowska, Z. (2015). Female education and fertility under state socialism in Central
and Eastern Europe. Population (English Edition) 70(4): 731–769.
Bujard, M. and Sulak, H. (2016). Mehr Kinderlose oder weniger Kinderreiche? Eine
Dekomposition der demografischen Treiber in unterschiedlichen Phasen des
Geburtenrückgangs in Deutschland. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie 68(3): 487–514. doi:10.1007/s11577-016-0373-6.
Bumpass, L.L., Rindfuss, R.R., Choe, M.K., and Tsuya, N.O. (2009). The institutional
context of low fertility: The case of Japan. Asian Population Studies 5(3): 215–
235. doi:10.1080/17441730903351479.
Burkimsher, M. and Zeman, K. (2017). Childlessness in Switzerland and Austria. In:
Kreyenfeld, M. and Konietzka, D. (eds.). Childlessness in Europe: Contexts,
causes, and consequences. Cham: Springer: 115–137. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-
44667-7_6.
Calot, G. and Sardon, J.-P. (2004). Methodology for the calculation of Eurostat’s
demographic indicators: Detailed report by the European Demographic
Observatory. Brussels: European Commission (Population and Social
Conditions 3/2003/F/no 26).
CFE (2017). Cohort Fertility and Education Database [electronic resource]. Vienna:
Vienna Institute of Demography. http://www.cfe-database.org.
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
684 http://www.demographic-research.org
Council of Europe (2005). Recent demographic developments in Europe 2004.
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Das Gupta, P. (1993). Standardization and decomposition of rates: A user’s manual.
Washington, D.C.: US Bureau of the Census (Current Population Reports,
Special Studies P23–186). https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/1993/demo/p23-186.pdf.
Delgado, M., Meil, G., and Zamora López, F. (2008). Spain: Short on children and
short on family policies. Demographic Research 19(27): 1059–1104.
doi:10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.27.
De Rose, A., Racioppi, F., and Zanatta, A.L. (2008). Italy: Delayed adaptation of social
institutions to changes in family behaviour. Demographic Research 19(19):
665–704. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.19.
Ekert-Jaffé, O., Joshi, H., Lynch, K., Mougin, R., Rendall, M.S., and Shapiro, D.
(2002). Fertility, timing of births, and socioeconomic status in France and
Britain: Social policies and occupational polarisation. Population (English
Edition) 57(3): 475–507. doi:10.2307/3246636.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). The incomplete revolution: Adapting to women’s new
roles. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. and Billari, F.C. (2015). Re-theorizing family demographics.
Population and Development Review 41(1): 1–31. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.
2015.00024.x.
Frejka, T. (2008). Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe: Incipient
decline of the two-child family model. Demographic Research 19(4): 47–72.
doi:10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.4.
Frejka, T. and Calot, G. (2001). Cohort reproductive patterns in low fertility countries.
Population and Development Review 27(1): 103–132. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.
2001.00103.x.
Frejka, T. and Gietel-Basten, S. (2016). Fertility and family policies in Central and
Eastern Europe after 1990. Comparative Population Studies 41(1): 3–56.
Frejka, T., Jones, G.W., and Sardon, J.-P. (2010). East Asian childbearing patterns and
policy developments. Population and Development Review 36(3): 579–606.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00347.x.
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 685
Frejka, T. and Sardon, J.-P. (2007). Cohort birth order, parity progression ratio, and
parity distribution trends in developed countries. Demographic Research 16(11):
315–374. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2007.16.11.
Frejka, T. and Zakharov, S. (2013). The apparent failure of Russia’s pronatalist family
policies. Population and Development Review 39(4): 635–647. doi:10.1111/j.17
28-4457.2013.00631.x.
Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., and Lappegård, T. (2015). The gender revolution: A
framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior.
Population and Development Review 41(2): 207–239. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.
2015.00045.x.
Human Fertility Database (2017). Human Fertility Database [electronic resource].
Rostock and Vienna: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and
Vienna Institute of Demography. www.humanfertility.org.
Jasilioniene, A., Jdanov, D.A., Sobotka, T., Andreev, E.M., Zeman, K., and
Shkolnikov, V.M. (2015). Methods protocol for the Human Fertility Database.
Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.
Jones, G.W., Straughan, P., and Chan, A. (2008). Ultra-low fertility in Pacific Asia:
Trends, causes, and policy issues. New York: Routledge.
Jones, G.W. and Gubhaju, B. (2009). Factors influencing changes in mean age at first
marriage and proportions never marrying in the low-fertility countries of East
and Southeast Asia. Asian Population Studies 5(3): 237–265. doi:10.1080/1744
1730903351487.
Kim, E.H.-W. and Cheung, A.K.L. (2015). Women’s attitudes toward family formation
and life stage transitions: A longitudinal study in Korea. Journal of Marriage
and Family 77(5): 1074–1090. doi:10.1111/jomf.12222.
Klüsener, S., Neels, K., and Kreyenfeld, M. (2013). Family policies and the Western
European fertility divide: Insights from a natural experiment in Belgium.
Population and Development Review 39(4): 587–610. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.
2013.00629.x.
Kohler, H.-P., Billari, F.C., and Ortega, J.A. (2002). The emergence of lowest-low
fertility in Europe during the 1990s. Population and Development Review 28(4):
641–680. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2002.00641.x.
Kreyenfeld, M. and Konietzka, D. (2017). Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, causes,
and consequences. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44667-7.
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
686 http://www.demographic-research.org
Lee, R. and Mason, A. (2014). Is low fertility really a problem? Population aging,
dependency, and consumption. Science 346(6206): 229–234. doi:10.1126/
science.1250542.
Leitner, S. (2010). Germany outpaces Austria in childcare policy: The historical
contingencies of ‘conservative’ childcare policy. Journal of European Social
Policy 20(5): 456–457. doi:10.1177/0958928710380482.
Lesthaeghe, R.J. (2010). The unfolding story of the second demographic transition.
Population and Development Review 36(2): 211–251. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.
2010.00328.x.
Ma, L. (2014). Economic crisis and women’s labor force return after childbirth:
Evidence from South Korea. Demographic Research 31(18): 511–552.
doi:10.4054/DemRes.2014.31.18.
McDonald, P. (2000). Gender equity, social institutions, and the future of fertility.
Journal of Population Research 17(1): 1–15. doi:10.1007/BF03029445.
McDonald, P. (2006). Low fertility and the state: The efficacy of policy. Population
and Development Review 32(3): 485–510. doi:10.1016/j.fertnstert.2006.07.1078.
Merz, E.M. and Liefbroer, A.C. (2012). The attitude toward voluntary childlessness in
Europe: Cultural and institutional explanations. Journal of Marriage and Family
74(3): 587–600. doi:10.1111/j.1741-3737.2012.00972.x.
Mills, M.C. (2015). The Dutch fertility paradox: How the Netherlands has managed to
sustain near replacement fertility. In: Rindfuss, R.R. and Choe, M.K. (eds.). Low
and lower fertility: Variations across developed countries. New York: Springer:
161–188. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21482-5_9.
Morgan, S.P. (1996). Characteristic features of modern American fertility. In:
Casterline, J.B., Lee, R.D., and Foote, K.A. (eds.). Fertility in the United States:
New patterns, new theories. New York: Population Council: 19–63.
doi:10.2307/2808004.
Morgan, S.P. and Rackin, H. (2010). The correspondence between fertility intentions
and behavior in the United States. Population and Development Review 36(1):
91–118. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00319.x.
Musick, K., England, P., Edgington, S., and Kangas, N. (2009). Education differences
in intended and unintended fertility. Social Forces 88(2): 543–572.
doi:10.1353/sof.0.0278.
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 687
Myrskylä, M., Goldstein, J., and Cheng, Y.-H.A. (2013). New cohort fertility forecasts
for the developed world: Rises, falls, and reversals. Population and
Development Review 39(1): 31–56. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00572.x.
Neels, K. and De Wachter, D. (2010). Postponement and recuperation of Belgian
fertility: How are they related to rising female educational attainment? Vienna
Yearbook of Population Research 8: 77–106. doi:10.1553/populationyearbook
2010s77.
Ní Bhrolcháin, M. (1987). Period parity progression ratios and birth intervals in
England and Wales, 1941–1971: A synthetic life table analysis. Population
Studies 41(1): 103–125. doi:10.1080/0032472031000142556.
ONS (2014). Percentage distribution of women of childbearing age by number of live-
born children, age, and year of birth of woman, 1920–1995, England and Wales.
Newport: Office for National Statistics.
Philipov,  D.,  Spéder,  Z.,  and Billari,  F.C.  (2006).  Soon,  later,  or  ever?  The impact  of
anomie and social capital on fertility intentions in Bulgaria (2002) and Hungary
(2001). Population Studies 60(3): 289–308. doi:10.1080/00324720600896080.
Pötzsch, O. (2016). Fertility in Germany before and after the 2011 Census: Still no
trend reversal in sight. Comparative Population Studies 41(1): 87–118.
Pullum, T.W., Tedrow, L.M., and Herting, J.R. (1989). Measuring change and
continuity in parity distributions. Demography 26(3): 485–498. doi:10.2307/
2061608.
Rindfuss, R.R. and Choe, M.K. (2015). Low and lower fertility: Variations across
developed countries. Cham: Springer International. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-214
82-5.
Rindfuss,  R.R.,  Choe,  M.K.,  and  Brauner-Otto,  S.R.  (2016).  The  emergence  of  two
distinct fertility regimes in economically advanced countries. Population
Research and Policy Review 35(3): 287–304. doi:10.1007/s11113-016-9387-z.
Sardon, J. (2006a). Recent demographic trends in Europe and the other developed
countries. Population (English Edition) 61(3): 197–266. doi:10.3917/pope.603.
0197.
Sardon, J. (2006b). Fertility in the developed English-speaking countries outside
Europe: Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Population
(English Edition) 61(3): 267–292. doi:10.3917/pope.603.0267.
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
688 http://www.demographic-research.org
Schoen, R. (2006). Insights from parity status life tables for the 20th century US. Social
Science Research 35(1): 29–39. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2004.06.002.
Sobotka, T. (2011). Fertility in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989: Collapse and
gradual recovery. Historical Social Research 36(2): 246–296.
Sobotka, T. (2012). Fertility in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland: Is there a common
pattern? Comparative Population Studies 36(2–3): 263–304.
Sobotka, T. (2017). Childlessness in Europe: Reconstructing long-term trends among
women born in 1900–1972. In: Kreyenfeld, M. and Konietzka, D. (eds.).
Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, causes, and consequences. Cham: Springer:
17–53.
Sobotka, T. and Testa, M.R. (2008). Attitudes and intentions toward childlessness in
Europe. In: Höhn, C., Avramov, D., and Kotowska, I.E. (eds.). People,
population change, and policies. Dordrecht: Springer: 177–211. doi:10.1007/
978-1-4020-6609-2_9.
Sobotka, T., Zeman, K., Potančoková, M., Eder, J., Brzozowska, Z., Beaujouan, É., and
Matysiak, A. (2015). European Fertility Datasheet 2015 [electronic resource].
Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography / Wittgenstein Centre for Demography
and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU). http://fertilitydata
sheet.org/.
Stloukal, L. (1999). Understanding the “abortion culture” in Central and Eastern
Europe. In: David, H.P. and Skilogianis, J. (eds.). From abortion to
contraception: A resource to public policies and reproductive behavior in
Central and Eastern Europe from 1917 to the present. Westport: Greenwood
Press: 23–37.
Spéder, Z. and Kapitány, B. (2014). Failure to realize fertility intentions: A key aspect
of the post-communist fertility transition. Population Research and Policy
Review 33(3): 393–418. doi:10.1007/s11113-013-9313-6.
Striessnig, E. and Lutz, W. (2013). Can below-replacement fertility be desirable?
Empirica 40(3): 409–425. doi:10.1007/s10663-013-9213-3.
Tan, P.L., Morgan, S.P., and Zagheni, E. (2016). A case for “reverse one-child” policies
in Japan and South Korea? Examining the link between education costs and
lowest-low fertility. Population Research and Policy Review 35(3): 327–350.
doi:10.1007/s11113-016-9390-4.
Demographic Research: Volume 38, Article 25
http://www.demographic-research.org 689
Tsuya, N.O. (2015). Below-replacement fertility in Japan: Patterns, factors, and policy
implications. In: Rindfuss, R.R. and Choe, M.K. (eds.). Low and lower fertility.
Cham: Springer: 87–106.
Toulemon,  L.,  Pailhé,  A.,  and  Rossier,  C.  (2008).  France:  High  and  stable  fertility.
Demographic Research 19(16): 503–556. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.16.
Van Bavel, J., Klesment, M., Beaujouan, É., Brzozowska, Z., Puur, A., Reher, D.S.,
Requena, M., Sandström, G., Sobotka T., and Zeman, K. (2015). Women’s
education and cohort fertility during the baby boom. Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, San Diego, United
States, April 30–May 2, 2015.
Van de Kaa, D.J. (1987). Europe’s second demographic transition. Population Bulletin
42(1): 1–59.
Wilson, C. (2013). Thinking about post-transitional demographic regimes: A reflection.
Demographic Research 28(46): 1373–1388. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2013.28.46.
Yoo, S.H. (2016). Postponement and recuperation in cohort marriage: The experience
of South Korea. Demographic Research 35(35): 1045–1078. doi:10.4054/Dem
Res.2016.35.35.
Zeman, K., Brzozowska, Z., Sobotka, T., Beaujouan, É., and Matysiak, A. (2014).
Cohort Fertility and Education Database: Methods protocol [electronic
resource]. Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography. http://www.eurrep.org/wp-
content/uploads/EURREP_Database_Methods_Protocol_Dec2014.pdf.
Zeman, K., Beaujouan, É., Brzozowska, Z., and Sobotka, T. (2017). Cohort fertility
decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios.
Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography and Human Fertility Database (Vienna
Institute of Demography Working Papers 03/2017 and Human Fertility Database
Research Report 2017–003).
Zeman et al.: Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios
690 http://www.demographic-research.org
